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This thesis explores the effects of work incentives in the labor market on 
intra-household time allocation. The coexistence of state-owned enterprise and 
private sector in China changes household members' market work incentives and 
then affects intra-household labor division among family members. Based on 
Albanesi and Olivetti's (2006) theoretical work which delivers predictions on the 
relation between earnings ratios, incentive pay and home hours, this thesis develops 
hypotheses and draws on rich panel data to test the theoretical predictions. The 
empirical results confirm that different ownerships can influence labor division 
among family members. Besides, the empirical results indicate that changes in labor 
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Intra-household allocation of labor has long been not only an important subject 
of interest for labor economists, but also a principal concern for many sociologists. 
Determinants of labor division among family members contribute to building up an 
efficient social operation scheme and to setting up corresponding policies in a 
country. However, literature on intra-household labor division is dominated by the 
analysis of most industrialized nations. In particular, little research has as yet been 
conducted on trends in labor division in China whose reform policies affect the well 
being of both men and women through her emerging labor market. Even if there is 
literature exploring intra-household allocation, the research is concentrated on health 
aspects (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Gibson and Rozelle, 2000), or gender wage 
differential (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999; Tsui, 
1998). Existing studies lack thorough investigation and complete characterization of 
labor division and provide little account on the changes of labor division. Hence, this 
thesis attempts to examine how the urban Chinese labor market affects the labor 
division among family members. 
To enhance our study of the determinants of intra-household allocation, we 
should first grasp a general picture of the economic developments of China in the 
past fifty years because the impact of institutional changes on intra-household 
allocation is inevitable. 
China's reform and open policy adopted since 1979 have brought profound 
social changes with a gradual economic transformation from a planned to a market 
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oriented economy in China for the last two decades. The economic reform brings the 
emergence of town-owned enterprises and the flow of privatization of many 
state-owned enterprises, which leads to the coexistence of two different ownerships 
originating under two distinct social systems. 
The situation provides Chinese households with great opportunities to enter the 
market and gain their earnings for family. Due to this reason, both husbands and 
wives participate the emerging labor market leaving their household chores behind, 
making the traditional Chinese saying "Men look after the outside; women look after 
the inside，，not fit the new living patterns in China any more. Besides, as the labor 
market evolved, previously suppressed returns to human capital may be recovered. 
Consequently, rising returns to schooling year are expected from the results of family 
member's individual time allocation, which also lead to changes of intra-household 
labor allocation. Therefore, this thesis tries to grasp the coexistence of different 
ownerships and rising returns to human capital in the market and to explore the 
extent of effect of family member's outside contract on division of labor among 
family members. 
According to Becker (1991), a pioneer in this field, there are two important 
determinants of division of labor within the family, biological difference and 
different experiences and investment in human capital. With Becker's framework, 
Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) build a model to study the joint determinant of gender 
differentials in labor market outcomes and in the household division of labor. They 
model households according to Chiappori's (1988, 1997) ‘‘collective labor supply" 
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approach. Albanesi and Olivetti's (2006) model delivers predictions about the 
impacts of differentials in incentive pay in labor market on labor division within the 
household. Gender earning differentials should be higher for married workers in 
occupation in which the incentive problem is more severe. The model indicates that 
this effect is stronger when the difference in home hours between women and men is 
greater. Besides, it also predicts that the difference in the fraction of incentive pay 
across male and female workers should be smaller for higher values of the 
female/male earnings ratio. This thesis draws on rich panel data to empirically 
estimate how much of the change of intra-household allocation is due to different 
ownerships in the market. 
To investigate the effect of schooling and ownership change on housework 
allocation, the empirical part employs family member's individual housework time 
as well as the time difference between them as measurements of relative changes of 
labor division within the family. (The husband/wife ratio of home hours is not 
employed in the empirical part because the number of observation shrinks by 60% if 
it is employed). Age, education, number of children, and ownership of work units are 
supposed to be the primary factors that have effects on the intra-household time 
allocation. If the empirical results support the hypotheses, then this paper will shed 
new light on the research in intra-household allocation. 
This thesis is a first attempt to incorporate the ownership factor into the study 
of relationship between intra-household allocation and market earnings to measure 
the effect of ownership change on intra-household time allocation among family 
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members, which distinguishes this paper from most of the existing literature. 
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, it is also the first attempt to examine if 
outside contracts of family members are determinants of the inside contract within a 
family. Although, due to the limitation of data, it is unlikely to clarify the feedback 
mechanism between incentive pay in the market and labor division within the 
household, this thesis will still contribute to the existing literature by shedding light 
on the situation of family and labor market in China. 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 presents predictions developed from 
the model by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006). In Section 4, several hypotheses will be 
developed through a descriptive introduction to the presence of time allocation 
within the family in China. Section 5 gives the introduction of the data, followed by 
discussions about measurements of variables and specification of the regression 
methodology. Section 6 presents the results of empirical tests followed by a 
discussion. Section 7 draws some conclusion from the findings. 
2. Literature Review 
Both sociology and economics have subfields concerned with intra-household 
relations; both have theory relying on access to resources to explain differences in 
allocation outcome within households. 
In sociology it is resource theory, developed by Blood and Wolfe (1960), 
Kabeer (1997), and Malhotra and Mather (1997). The resources available to each 
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partner determine the extent one will bargain and how closely the outcomes will 
match one's preferences (Kabeer, 1994). Blood and Wolfe's (1960) study found that 
education and employment served as good predictors of decision-making outcomes 
between husbands and wives, with women who were more educated and employed 
outside the home having greater roles in decision-making. 
In economics, it is bargaining models of the household (McElroy, 1990; 
McElroy and Homey, 1981). Bargaining models of the household bring attention to 
how one's options outside marriage play a role in bargaining outcomes within the 
relationship, particularly one's willingness to press hard for one's preferences if the 
end result can be the dissolution of the relationship. 
Gary Becker is the pioneer in investigating the allocation of time and wealth of 
each family member so as to maximize family well-being. According to his pioneer 
work (Becker, 1981), gender division of labor within family can be explained as an 
economic response to market valuation of the time of family member which in return 
is assumed to reflect the productivity of individuals in the market. Furthermore, 
shifting away from the traditional gender specialization of labor within households 
can be explained by the increase in married women's potential earning power in the 
market (Becker, 1985). 
With Becker's framework, a series of empirical studies were developed to 
examine Becker's unitary models (Schultz, 1990; Browning et al., 1994; Fortin and 
Lacroix, 1997). However, the empirical results of these studies reject Becker's 
hypotheses. In review of these limitations of Becker's unitary models, models that 
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take into account individual decisions within a family of heterogeneous agents 
emerge in the past two decades. There are cooperative bargaining models (McElroy 
and Homey, 1981; Lunberg and Pollak, 1993), non-cooperative bargaining models 
(Ulph, 1988) and collective models (Chiappori, 1988). 
The collective model can be viewed as a kind of cooperative bargaining model. 
Major difference in collective model and cooperative bargaining model is that the 
former does not impose any structure of the bargaining process while the latter does. 
There are a series of empirical studies following to explore the value of this model. 
Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) investigate the collective model in the 
area of household production. In 2002, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix perform 
empirical study for household labor supply under collective approach. 
Although plenty of theories have been established and successfully tested in the 
western context, little research has yet been done on Chinese households relating the 
unique coexistence of different ownerships in labor market. Even if there is some 
literature exploring intra-household allocation, the research is concentrated either on 
the health aspects (Subramanian and Deaton, 1996; Gibson and Rozelle, 2000) or 
gender wage differential (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993; Tsui, 1998). Hersch and 
Straton's (1997) study finds that adding housework time to the wage equation 
decreases the unexplained component of the gender wage gap for married workers by 
about 10 percent points. These results are cited in Blau (1998) and Joshi, Paci and 
Waldfogel (1999) as evidence of how time allocation decisions within the family can 
lead to gender differences in the labor market. 
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There also exists literature attempting to examine women's welfare within the 
family through studying the time allocation of household. Zhang (1999) established a 
theoretical model incorporating dowry to offer an alternative analysis on the division 
of joint product within the marriage. His theoretical and empirical findings imply that 
dowry enhances bride's bargaining power of the bride and then changes the labor 
allocation result within that household. However, because the data utilized in 
Zhang's paper is collected from Taiwan households, there is no institutional factor 
included in the empirical tests of the paper to incorporate the unique feature in 
mainland China. 
The existing literature hasn't fully explored the intra-household time allocation 
in Chinese household. It should be noted that, unlike developed countries, China has 
some special institutional factors such as privatization and one-child policy. These 
institutional factors should be incorporated into the research, especially in the filed of 
household economics. Based on the directions indicated by existing literature, this 
paper will examine the predictions delivered by Albanesi and Olivetti's (2006) model 
by incorporating the institutional factor and investigate the determinants of labor 
division among family members. 
3. Theoretical Model and Predictions 
Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) model households according to Chiappori's (1988， 
1997) "collective labor supply" approach. Household value a public home good 
produced with time of both spouses. The intra-household allocation of home hours is 
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efficient, and thus depends on the spouses' relative earnings. On the labor market, 
firms and workers contract over earnings. Since workers' effort is private information, 
there generates a moral hazard problem. Following Becker (1985), Albanesi and 
Olivette (2006) assume that the utility cost of effort is increasing in home hours. In 
addition, they assume that home hours are private information, which introduces 
adverse selection. In an extension of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), firms offer 
incentive compatible labor contracts that are constrained-efficient. Optimal contracts 
imply that workers' earnings and effort are inversely related to home hours. 
Therefore, the labor market and households are two components of our model 
economy. On the labor market, firms and individuals agents negotiate the terms of 
labor contracts. Households efficiently choose the allocation of home hours across 
spouses. 
On the labor market, Albanesi and Olivette (2006) model that the output of one 
agent is related to her effort, according to 
y = f ( e ) + 0) , (1) 
The function f (e) denotes expected output, where f is strictly increasing, twice 
continuously differentiable and weakly concave. 
Each agent has a utility function: 
U(c, h,e) = - exp(-cr[c - v(h, e)]) , (2) 
where c is individual consumption of the market good, h denotes home hours, and e 
denotes effort applied to market work. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is 
strictly greater than zero. And v(-) denotes the disutility of market and home work. 
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According to Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), firms choose labor contracts to 
maximize the surplus from the employment relationship. If firms observe home 
hours but effort is not observable, they face a moral hazard problem. Firms will 
choose labor contracts to solve: 
m a X S ( e ; h ) (ProblemFl) { w ( y ),e} ,ee [0 
subject to 
e = a r g m a x E [u ( e )] (4) e € [ 0 ,1 ] 
where the objective function is the expected surplus from the employment 
relationship, and (4) is the incentive compatibility for constraint. They adopt a 
CARA specification, thus the employment relationship is: 
S(e; h) = f(e) — v(h, e)-aZ2 (w)2 / 2 (5) 
In Albanesi and Olivetti's (2006) model, three ingredients of this paradigm are 
crucial from their standpoint. Each spouse individually chooses consumption of the 
market good and efforts. Spouses jointly choose home hours, the level of production 
of the home public good and a sharing rule for household wealth. Besides, individual 
and joint decisions occur simultaneously. 
They (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006) denote the amount of household wealth a 
attributed to each spouse with st，for i = f,m, where f, m stand for female and male, 
respectively. The production function for the home public good is 
G 二 g � h f , h m , k ) , (23) 
where k is the amount of market good used in home production. They restrict 
attention to specifications in which hf and hm are substitutes. 
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Therefore, Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) model that the households' problem is 
to choose G, k, hi and Si to maximize: 
Z 义 , （ 〜 ， + 0 l o g ( G ) ， (Problem H) 
' = f 
subject to (23)， hf,hm>0 , and Y , i S i + k = a + u . T h e parameters, ， fo r 
i = f , m , represent the weight of each spouse in household decisions. Individual 
value functions are defined by Vi, for i = f,m . 
Combining the above two problems faced by the firms and households 
respectively, Albanesi and Olivetti (2006) adopt a given functional form for the 
above two problems and solve them. They find that the solution to this problem 
depends on the spouses' opportunity cost of home hours, determined by labor 
contracts. Based on the assumption of the substitutability of spousal hours in the 
production of public home good by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), one crucial 
implication from the model is that marginal differences in market earnings will give 
rise to an allocation of home hours in which the spouse with lower earning potential 
in market work devotes more time to home production. The solution of their model 
(Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006) clarifies that the opportunity cost of home hours for 
each spouse depends on work incentives in labor contracts and determines the 
optimal allocation of home hours. 
Two predictions are delivered by their model (Albanesi and Olivetti, 2006). 
First, they predict that gender earning differentials should be higher for married 
workers in occupations in which the incentive problem is more severe. And this 
effect is stronger when the differences in home hours between women and men are 
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greater. Second, the dependence of labor market outcomes on home hours delivers 
additional predictions on the relation between earnings ratios, incentive pay and 
home hours across spouses. The husband/wife ratio of home hours should display a 
negative correlation with both the husband/wife earning ratio and the difference in 
the fraction of incentive pay. 
4. Hypotheses Development 
The new society provides various opportunities for Chinese household members 
to participate in the labor force and make economic contribution to their family. Each 
of them has different characteristics and different human capitals, with age, 
education, gender and physical condition as important factors for household 
members to decide their own market values. Furthermore, these factors can lead to 
household members' intra-household time and effort allocation. Chinese wives start 
to free themselves from household chores to participate labor market, and thus 
traditional female household chores now partly begin to transfer to the male party in 
the family. The husband may start to take up part of the housework, or more 
extremely, he may manage most of the housework to ensure his wife's labor supply 
owing to the wife's high return of work time. 
It is well known in the bargaining theories that access to outside resources and 
options should increase one's bargaining power in the family (Blood and Wolfe, 1960; 
Becker, 1981; McElroy, 1990). A person with more resources outside the marriage 
will be less likely to compromise and hence the outcome is more likely to be in her 
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or his favor. These resources can be age, appearance, education, employment 
opportunities or family support. Although this thesis is not based on bargaining 
model, these factors are also important determinants of intra-household allocation. 
Age, as a given endowment, is one of the decisive factors for one's market value, 
or opportunity cost of doing housework, which will theoretically affect individual's 
time division between market and family (Becker, 1991). Biologically, a person's 
energy is negatively related to one's biological age in the labor market. When other 
conditions are the same, employer tends to hire a younger person than an older one 
because the former usually works more efficiently due to higher energy. It means that 
younger people have higher market value in labor force, which will make them put 
more time and effort in the market to realize higher market return instead of putting it 
in the family. For a family, husband and wife are two basic components who both 
have their own work and specific endowments. Since the object of marriage is to 
maximize the unitary utility of the whole family, each household member will adjust 
their time allocation according to individual factors and the other party's factors to 
maximize family utility. Consequently, we hypothesize that age is negatively 
related to individual's time spent in the family, that is, younger people tend to put 
more time in the market to realize higher return. For a family, by comparison 
between the couple, the younger part will tend to do less housework to assure his or 
her labor supply in the market (Hypothesis 1). 
As indicated by Zhang (1999), education is another important determinant of 
one person's time and effort division. Generally speaking, people with more 
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schooling years possess higher potential to get better jobs and greater payment 
compared to people with less schooling years. Within the family, the differences in 
schooling years between husband and wife should make each of them specialize in 
different fields to maximize family utility. But because income level in Chinese 
households are low, the party specialize in housework still has demand to earn 
another income for the family. Thus, both husband and wife are in the labor force and 
work to earn income for their family. The differences in individual factors cause 
different time division of husband and wife. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
schooling years has a positive relationship with labor supply, which will cause the 
party with more schooling years put more time in the market compared to the other 
party in a family (Hypothesis 2). 
The third factor, which incorporates the institutional features in China, is the 
ownership of the household member's working unit. Following Becker's (1985) 
direction, we recognize that shifting away from the traditional gender specialization 
of labor within the family can be explained by the increase in married women's 
potential earning power in the market. If both the husband and the wife have outside 
work, the time allocation within the family will be adjusted to their revaluated 
market value of time. If the wife's market value of time is high enough, i.e. the 
marginal return on the wife's effort is high enough; she will put more effort on her 
job by reducing housekeeping time due to constant total time endowment. Therefore, 
the typical female housework begins to transfer to the male party within the family. 
In particular, it is possible that the ownerships of the household members' work 
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units are different due to the coexistence of state-owned enterprise and private sector 
in China. The first prediction delivered in Albanesi and Olivetti's model is that 
gender earning differentials should be higher for married workers in occupations in 
which the incentive problems is more severe. We argue that incentive problems are 
more stringent in private sector than in state-owned enterprise. Studies indicated that 
(Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter, 1994) in private sector, to meet the 
requirement for high productivity earnings depend on the total production led by 
individual's effort input. In private sectors, larger input such as time and effort which 
lead to greater production will help individuals obtain higher return. But in many 
state-owned enterprises, the amount of payment is constant, not substantially related 
to a person's effort or performance, and working time is almost fixed, disregarding 
gender of the workers; so that people do not have incentive to work harder or longer, 
and the gender differentials are not embodied in most of positions in state-owned 
enterprise (Che and Qian, 1998). But in private sectors, there are incentive bonuses 
or incentive wages that always motivate the workers to put their effort and time to 
maximize their individual value. Therefore, people working in private sectors are 
likely to efficiently allocate their effort and time between household production and 
labor market. According to the predictions by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), for 
couples whose gap across incentive problem is more wide, difference of housework 
time between husband and wife should be greater. They suggest that firms can offer 
different contracts to female and male workers since gender is observable. Based on 
these assumptions, female and male workers have different incentive contracts which 
14 
reinforce the firm's assumption and the intra-household division. Therefore, 
considering the effect of different ownerships, we expect that working in the private 
sector will make household members efficiently allocate their time to maximize 
individual value (Hypothesis 3). 
5. Research Methodology 
5.1. Data 
The data that we use in this thesis are derived from the China Health and 
Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which was collected by the Carolina Population Center 
(CPC) at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, the Institute of Nutrition 
and Food Hygiene, and the Chinese Academy of Preventive Medicine. The CHNS 
project was designed to examine the effects of the health, nutrition, and family 
planning policies and programs implemented by national and local governments and 
to see how the social and economic transformation of Chinese society is affecting the 
health and nutritional status of its population. This survey was conducted by an 
international team of researchers whose backgrounds include nutrition, public health, 
sociology, Chinese studies, demography and economics. The survey took place over 
a 3-day period using a multistage, random cluster process to draw a sample of about 
3800 households in 1989, 1991 and 1993，and about 4400 households in 1997 and 
2000 with a total of 16,000 individuals in nine provinces that vary substantially in 
geography, economic development, public resources, and health indicators. 
This thesis focuses on married couples' labor division within the family in 
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relation to their labor market activities, thus we utilize the urban Chinese households 
sample made up of married household members with spouse present. CHNS data are 
useful in this study because they include detailed information about the time spent on 
different household chores as well as a wide range of relevant individual and 
household characteristics. The data also provide information on the type of work unit 
of each household member. This data contains information on both the rural and 
urban households. Sine the object of this paper is to test the effect of ownership 
change on intra-household allocation; this thesis employs housework member's 
individual housework time as well as their housework time difference to measure 
labor division. But in rural areas, most household members make their living by 
farming instead of formal jobs because there is rarely state-owned enterprise or 
private sector in rural China. Consequently, the time allocation of these household 
members will be substantially different from household members owning formal jobs 
in urban areas. Thus the measurement of variables in this thesis is not applicable for 
rural households in China. Therefore, only urban Chinese households are contained 
in the empirical part in this thesis. 
5.2. Variables 
According to the research objectives and the research questions this thesis has 
set, the variables used in this study and their measurement are different from those in 
the existing literature. 
The first variable is the dependent variable, the measurement of household 
member's labor division in the family. The CHNS data do contain data for household 
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member's housework time in household survey, which makes us able to test our 
hypothesis. In the third section, we argue that, age, schooling year and ownership of 
work unit contribute to the changes of household members' time allocation between 
work and family. Due to different characteristics between the couple, intra-household 
allocation will be altered according to each household member's market value. 
Thus, the total housework time difference between couples will be used to measure 
the change in housework allocation within the family. 
There are three independent variables we employ to test our hypothesis in this 
thesis, total housework time, time spent on cooking and clothes, time spent on taking 
care of children. Total housework time contain the latter two variables and time spent 
on buying food. Housework activities, such as cooking, washing and ironing 
clothes and taking care of children, need intensive care and represent housework 
allocation. However, the activity of buying food does not require specific personal 
skills. And such an activity is usually taken by the party who does cooking in the 
family. Therefore, I choose time spent on cooking and clothes, time spent on taking 
care of children as independent variables in addition to total housework time, in hour 
per day unit. 
This thesis is aimed to get understanding of intra-household labor division. So 
besides estimating effects of age, schooling year and ownership on individual 
housework time, we also examine the difference of housework time within the family 
to clarify the relative change between husband and wife. The difference of time spent 
on housework is obtained by subtracting wife's time from husband's time. We also 
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have three dependent variables, difference of time spent on total housework, 
difference of time spent on cooking and clothes, difference of time spent on child 
care. 
The measurement of ownership is a dummy variable to indicate if a household 
member is working in the private sector. If the work unit of a household member is 
private sector, the ownership dummy is valued at 1, and it is valued as 0 if it is not 
private sector. There are many types of work units according to the survey 
questionnaire. Only the type of the state-owned enterprise or institute is classified as 
SOE in this thesis while collective enterprise, township enterprise and private sector 
are classified as private sectors. 
Wage is an indispensable determinant for time allocation for household 
members. This thesis also controls wage level for household members in empirical 
part. It is well know that endogeneity will be caused once wage is in the estimation 
part. Thus, this thesis employs the market average wage level for household members 
as an instrumental variable to eliminate endogeneity. Market average wage level is 
the average wage of all the market labor in the same age, which represents 
individual's market wage return for household members in a certain age. 
The variable of number of children is another factor which to a certain degree 
influences the quantity of housework in a family. This variable is categorized by age. 
The age of preschool children covers from 0 to 6. The age of school-age children 
ranges from 7 to 18. The last category includes children above 18. 
5.3. Regression Models 
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Since the sample contains data across households and over time, the panel data 
methodology will be utilized in this paper. The basic regression model can be 
specified as follows: 
yit =a + X i t p + uit i=l,......；t=l,......，5 
where i denotes the cross-section dimension, household ID, and t indicates the time 
dimension, X]t is a 1XA: vector of observations (including age, schooling year, 
ownership, wage and the differences of these variables) on k explanatory variables 
for the / t h household in the t t h period, /3 is a A: X 1 vector of parameters, uit is a 
disturbance term and is defined as 
^ i t = l U i + V i t + £ it 
where ju t denotes the unobservable individual effect, vit denotes the 
unobservable time effect, and s i t denotes the error term. 
Two methods, pooled OLS and fixed effects, are adopted in this paper. Because 
age difference and schooling year difference between husband and wife do not 
change with time, they will be excluded in the regressions of the fixed effects model. 
If the ownership of the work unit where a household member works in changes, the 
fixed effects regression will measure the effect of ownership change on the 
intra-household allocation. 
To obtain clear results about the effects of ownership on the intra-household 
allocation of housework, I will define three interaction terms to add into the 
regressions. The first interaction term is defined as 1 only if the husband works in the 
private sector when the wife works in SOE. Similarly, the second interaction term is 
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defined as 1 only if the wife works in private sector when the husband works in SOE. 
The third interaction is defined as 1 if both the husband and the wife work in private 
sector. By defining three interaction terms in this way, all households are divided into 
four groups, using the group of both husband and wife in state-owned enterprises as 
the base group in empirical estimations. 
Table 1 summarizes characteristics of husbands' variables in the urban sample. 
There are three columns in Table 1, private sector, state-owned enterprise and whole 
sample including private sector and state-owned enterprise. Type of work unit is a 
dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if the household member works in private sector. 
The unit for the breakdown of housework time is hour per day. The total housework 
time is summation of time on buying food, time on cooking, time on ironing and 
washing clothes, and time on taking care of children. Since the total time endowment 
per day is twenty-four hours, values exceeding the upper limit are deemed as missing 
values. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of wives' individual variables from 
urban households. The whole sample in Table 1 and Table 2 includes 1143 
households, each having a husband and a wife at least. For 1143 Chinese households, 
there are 306 male household members working in private sector and 837 household 
members working in state-owned enterprises. In these Chinese households, there are 
414 female household members working in private sectors and 729 household 
members working in state-owned enterprises. 
In empirical part, this thesis also employs the differences of variables between 
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husband and wife to estimate labor divisions within a family. Values for variables 
indicating differences between couples are obtained by subtracting wife's variable 
value from husband's variable value. The descriptive statistics of difference between 
couples are summarized in Table 9, with a sample size of 994 Chinese households. 
The mean values for difference of three dependent variables between husband 
and wife are negative, which means that, on average, husbands spend less time on 
housekeeping than their wives. From the statistic results, it suggests that generally 
Chinese wives spend about one hour handling various housework more than their 
husbands do. The difference of time spent on total housework includes the time 
difference of buying food, the time difference of cooking and clothes and the time 
difference of taking care of children, and thus has the greatest value among three 
independent variables. 
6. Empirical Results 
This section reports the estimated effect of ownership, education and age on 
household members' individual time allocation as well as on intra-household labor 
division. Two methods are utilized in this thesis for urban Chinese households, 
pooled OLS and fixed effects methods. First, this thesis employs three dependent 
variables to measure different housework activities. Each dependent variable has two 
regression tables indicating husbands' and wives' individual housekeeping time 
change respectively. Therefore, six tables, from Table 3 to Table 8, are used to 
estimate the effects of age, schooling year and ownership on household members' 
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individual housework time. 
The last three tables, Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12, are aimed to measure the 
relative change within the family. Since both parties are supposed to alter their 
schedule or allocation according to both parties' factors, the process of adjustment 
will lead to a result that part of the housework will shift to one of the parties. Thus, in 
the last three tables, we can get further understanding of labor division change within 
a family. 
6.1 Individual Housework Time 
Husband's individual time does have a negative relationship with husband's 
wage per hour in Table 3 regression (4), which supports our hypothesis in Section 3 
that husband tends to put more time in the market to earn higher return by decreasing 
his housework time. Although we fail to show that age has significant effect on 
husband's housework time, in pooled OLS we find that wife's private sector dummy 
is negatively related to husband's housework time. The results indicate that husband 
will reduce his housework time if his wife's work unit changes from a state-owned 
enterprise to a private sector. Such a result delivers an implication that in private 
sector where the incentive problem is severe, the wife has a contract which will 
reinforce her observable biological advantage. Thus, she will spend more time on 
housework, and then release her husband from household chores. 
Considering there are unobservable individual effects in pooled OLS regression 
results, we use fixed effects methods to remove these unobservable individual effects. 
Regression (4) and regression (8) in Table 3, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7 and 
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Table 8, employ market average wage level as instrumental variable to eliminate 
endogeneity caused by individual's wage level. The fixed effects regression results 
do not deliver the same implications as the first four regressions do. There is no 
significant coefficient in the regression results, indicating that husband's individual 
housework time does not have relationship with his age, schooling year and his or his 
wife's work unit ownership. The results in regression (5) and regression (8) in Table 
3 do not imply any statistical effect of wife's ownership dummy on husband's 
individual time. Even husband's own wage level does not have significant effect on 
his total housework time. 
The pooled OLS estimation results of Husband's time spent on cooking, 
washing and ironing clothes in Table 5 are similar to the results in Table 3. Both 
husband's own wage level and his wife's private sector dummy variable are 
negatively correlated with husband's time spent on cooking and clothes. Using the 
fixed effects method to eliminate effects from unobservable individual variables, we 
can not find significant effects of the above two variables on husband's individual 
time. 
For husband's time spent on taking care of children, statistically, except number 
of preschool children, the main determinant is wife's private sector dummy, which is 
implied in regression (4) in Table 7. For this dependent variable, husband's own 
wage level does not show any effect as it does on the first and second dependent 
variable. 
The empirical results on husband's individual time show us limited evidence for 
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our hypothesis. Nevertheless, the empirical results on wife's individual time provide 
us further findings to explore. In Table 4, we can state from regression (4) that wife's 
time spent on total housework work has a positive relationship with husband's 
private sector dummy, but a negative one with her own private sector dummy 
variable. The results are consistent with our hypothesis in Section 3 that wife will 
increase her own work time by decreasing her housekeeping time if wife's work unit 
changes ownership from state-owned enterprise to private sector. If wife's husband 
switched from state-owned enterprise to private sector, wife will take on more 
responsibility of taking care of the family by increasing her total housework time. 
Regression (7) in Table 4 includes three interaction terms as choosing the group 
of both husband and wife working in state-owned enterprises as base group. 
Therefore, the regression results indicate that when both husband's and wife's work 
units change from a state-owned enterprise to private sector, wife's individual time 
spent on total housework will increase by 1.236 hour per day. Besides, the coefficient 
of the second interaction term implies that if wife's work unit does not change but 
husband's work unit alters to private sector, wife's total housework time will still 
increase by 1.048 hour per day. From such a comparison, we find that when both 
husband and wife work in private sector, in which we argued in section 4 that 
incentive problem is severe, the labor division between husband and wife is greater 
than for other groups. Besides, we also find that in regression (7) in Table 3, such a 
difference does not show any change on husband's total housework time, which 
makes it a sharp comparison in a family. 
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For wife's time spent on cooking, washing and ironing clothes, regression (4)，s 
results in Table 6 indicate that it is husband's private sector dummy, but not wife's 
own ownership dummy that has effect on wife's time spent on cooking and clothes. 
Moreover, ownership changes from husband's work unit no matter wife's work unit 
changes ownership or not, have significant effect on wife's cooking and clothes time, 
but not on husband's cooking and clothes time. 
When the dependent variable is time spent on taking care of children, neither of 
husband's and wife's ownership has effect on child care time allocation. Only wife's 
child care time will be increased by 0.635 hour per day if both husband and wife 
switch from state-owned enterprise to private sector. 
From empirical results in Table 3 to Table 8, we are able to estimate the effects 
on individual time allocation. However, to get further understanding of the labor 
division within a family, it is necessary to use the difference of variable to measure 
the relative change between husband and wife. 
6.2 Housework Allocation Within a Family 
The allocations of total housework and cooking and taking care of clothes are 
significantly influenced by age and schooling year difference between husband and 
wife within a family. Older husbands will tend to take on more housework activities 
than their wives. But the education gap between husband and wife enhances further 
educated party to gain higher return in the market, so that this party will do less 
housework in the family. 
By eliminating unobservable individual effects using fixed effects method, the 
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results in Table 10 and Table 11 strongly supports the findings in the former tables 
that change of housework allocation comes from wife's part, but not from husband's 
part. Furthermore, the cause of housework allocation's change is due to change in 
husband's ownership, but the effects of such a change are on wife's housework time 
while husband's housework time are not sensitive to changes in his own or his wife's 
ownership. 
By comparison among the regression results in Table 10, Table 11 and Table 12, 
the influence from schooling year difference and age difference on housework 
allocation change varies from a substantially effect on time difference on cooking 
and clothes and on total housework time difference to statistically zero-deemed effect 
on child-care time difference. Such a change of significance levels of independent 
variables should be traced back to the breakdowns of the dependent variable in Table 
1 and Table 2. The total housework time is the summary of three breakdowns, one 
of which is time spent on buying food. Because there is no biological factors directly 
related to characteristics of the action buying food, this thesis chooses to exclude this 
part from the housekeeping time. But the activity of cooking and washing clothes is 
less closely related to biological factors, which is one of the reasons why the effects 
of age difference and schooling year difference on the second variable are enhanced 
rather those on total housework time. 
In fixed effects regressions, age difference and schooling year difference are not 
included because these two variables do not change with time for a fixed couple. Age 
difference between a husband and his wife was determined when they got married, 
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which could not be changed any more. Schooling year difference is similar as age 
difference, although there are chances that schooling year difference can be altered 
with time after marriage. But in most cases, schooling year difference was also 
determined when the couple got married. 
From the empirical results, it is also obvious that the number of preschool 
children is an important determinant for time on total housework and time on taking 
care of children. The number of preschool children is supposed to affect time 
allocation within family because preschool children need the most intensive care 
from parents. Family member's individual time spent on taking care of children is 
not related to his or her individual factors, which is suggested by fixed effects results 
in Table 7 and 8. Consistently, there is on evidence in Table 12 which indicating that 
the individual factor difference has impact on housework allocation between husband 
and wife. Therefore, the results drive us to analyze the character of this activity, 
which then make us turn to biological factors for further explanation. 
7. Conclusion 
Since the reform and open policy has brought dramatic changes to the Chinese 
society, the well being of both men and women are gradually influenced through the 
emerging labor market, changing their initial living style consequently. Family 
members are getting opportunities to receive formal education and participate in the 
labor force so as to recover their previously suppressed returns to human capital. 
The empirical results in this paper indicate that while increasing schooling 
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years and market incentives can significantly reduce family member's time spent on 
housework, the effects on the change in intra-household labor division are embodied 
by the female party in a family. At the same time, the Chinese husbands will 
significantly reduce their housekeeping time to put more effort on their work if their 
wage level in the market is increasing. But compared to the effects of their wives' 
ownership change, the effects of husbands' own ownership change can be regarded 
as zero. 
Results for Chinese women's sensitivity to their work incentive are not 
consistent with our hypothesis. Their housework time is substantially affected by 
husbands' and their own ownership change. Whether their husband switches from 
SOE to private sector or the other way, that is, whenever there is change in the family 
members' work units, the female party will take on more housekeeping responsibility 
compared to the other party in the family. In Albanesi and Olivetti's (2006) 
theoretical work, one implication is that firms can offer different contracts to female 
and male works since gender is observable. They states that, in particular, if firms 
believe that home hours are higher for women, the firms will offer them labor 
contracts with lower earnings and effort. This implies that the opportunity cost of 
home hours for women is lower. Then, it is efficient for wives to allocate more time 
to home production, thus confirming firms' beliefs. According to such an argument, 
the estimation results confirm the hypothesis that when both parties work in 
enterprise in which incentive problem is severe, the female party will do more 
housework than other groups. Another finding in this thesis is that wife's wage level, 
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but not husband's wage level, has effect on the allocation of doing cooking and 
taking care of clothes. The results in regression (4) in Table 12 support the second 
prediction developed from Albanesi and Olivetti's model that the difference of time 
on housework between husband and wife has a negative relationship with earning 
differentials between husband and wife. 
Therefore I conclude that the intra-household labor allocation is affected by 
wage level and ownership change in the labor market with various effect on two 
parties in the family. For total housework, the female party is more likely to adjust 
their time allocation according to changes both from their own market factors and 
from their couples' market factors. Whenever there is a change in each party's work 
unit ownership factors, the female party will always tend to should on more share of 
housekeeping work. For these housekeeping work that highly related to biological 
factors such as taking care of children, the male party is not likely to have significant 
reactions to changes in the family. 
Female household members participate and get their earnings in the emerging 
labor market; however, they still spend their time and effort taking care of their 
family. The feedback mechanism on the optimal intra-household division of labor 
contributes to their behaviors due to the firms' belief of women's higher productivity 
in home and to the enforcement of earning differentials in the market. The biological 
differences, such as women's ability to bear children, are incorporated in Albanesi 
and Olivetti's model by allowing for higher relative productivity of women in home 
production. Empirical results in this thesis also suggest that home production 
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activities which are closely related to biological factors such as taking care of 
children are more sensitive to female household members' variable changes than 
activities such as buying food and cooking. 
This thesis explores the effects of work incentives in the labor market on 
intra-household time allocation, incorporating different ownership developed in labor 
market. This thesis provides the evidence that the outside contracts with the market 
of household members can affect the inside contract on housework allocation among 
family members, but with distinct effects on different party. However, due to the 
limitation of the data employed in this study, it is available to test the one-side effect, 
but is unlikely to identify the causality problem in the feedback mechanism between 
home hours and the incentive problems in the labor market. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Spouse Variables (Husband) 
Private Sector SOE Whole Sample 
Variables � ( 2 ) (3) 
Husband 
39.464 41.766 41.150 
A g e (9.211) (9.017) (9.122) 
8.552 11.339 10.593 
Schooling year (3.152) (3.470) (3.604) 
1 0 0.268 
Type of work unit ( 0 ) ( 0 ) (0.443) 
7.879 7.803 7.823 
Working time (hour/day) ( L 3 7 o ) (0.813) (0.993) 
2.125 1.637 1.768 
Wage per hour (3.910) (2.994) (3.270) 
1.742 1.881 1.843 
Market average wage per hour ( 0 . 6 4 7 ) (0.655) (0.656) 
1.684 1.799 1.768 
Total housework time (hour/day) yl 6 7 2 ) ^ ？对） ^ 7 2 1 ) 
0.324 0.348 0.342 
Time on buying food ( 0 . 4 4 3 ) (0.496) (0.482) 
0.957 1.135 1.087 
Total time on cooking and clothes y2 ( 0 9 0 6 ) ( L 0 3 2 ) (1.003) 
0.791 0.929 0.892 
Time on cooking ( 0 . 8 5 6 ) (0.912) (0.899) 
0.166 0.206 0.195 
Time on ironing and washing clothes ( Q 2 6 3 ) ( 0 3 4 8 ) (0.327) 
0.403 0.316 0.339 
Time on taking care of children y3 ( 1 2 4 1 ) ( 1 . 2 3 0 ) (1.233) 
Sample Size ^06 837 U43 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Spouse Variables (Wife) 
Private Sector SOE Whole Sample 
Variables � ( 2 ) � 
Wife 
38.891 38.785 38.823 
A g e (8.359) (8.405) (8.385) 
8.012 10.754 9.761 
Schooling year ( 3 . 4 0 5 ) (3.535) (3.728) 
1 0 0.362 
Type of work unit ( Q ) ( 0 ) (0.481) 
7.947 7.774 7.836 
Working time (hour/day) ( 1 6 0 9 ) ( 0.914) (1.214) 
1.573 1.524 1.541 
Wage per hour ( 2 . 7 5 6 ) (2.606) (2.660) 
1.573 1.604 1.593 
Market average wage per hour ( 0 4 9 7 ) ( 0 5 0 7 ) (0.503) 
2.839 2.901 2.879 
Total housework time (hour/day) yl (2 388) (2 275) (2.316) 
0.440 0.470 0.459 
Time on buying food ( 0 . 5 7 1 ) (0.576) (0.574) 
1.850 1.867 1.861 
Total time on cooking and clothes y2 (1 153) (1 245) (1 212) 
1.326 1.342 1.336 
Time on cooking ( 0 . 9 7 5 ) (1.034) (1.013) 
0.524 0.525 0.525 
Time on ironing and washing clothes � ^ (0.543) (0.512) 
0.549 0.564 0.559 
Time on taking care of children y3 ( 1 7 4 0 ) ( 1 7 1 8 ) (1.725) 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Descriptive Statistics of Household Variables (Urban Sample) 
Variables Whole Sample 
-1.061 
Time difference on total housework (hour/day)* ( 2 口⑴ 
-0.733 
Time difference on cooking and clothes (hour/day)* 5 
-0.206 
Time difference on taking care of children (hour/day)* 2 2 7 ) 
2.300 
Age difference* (2 ¢76) 
0.740 
Schooling year difference* (3 �川） 
0.181 
Wage per hour difference (1 ^ ^ 
0.255 
Average wage per hour difference (0 
0.236 
Husband in private sector dummy (0 ^ 5 ) 
0.333 
Wife in private sector dummy (0 471) 
0.051 
Husband in private sector, wife in SOE ^20) 
0.147 
Wife in private sector, husband in SOE (0 355) 
0.185 
Both husband and wife in private sector (0 ^39^ 
Number of preschool children .2818312 
Sample size 
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